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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case

This is an appeal from a conviction and sentence for a single count of possession of a
controlled substance (methamphetamine), LC. § 37-2732 (c)(I). R 197-205. Relief should be
granted because the state did not present sufficient evidence to support the conviction.
Specifically, the state did not prove that Appellant Tami Southwick had knowledge and control
of either the methamphetamine residue found on a scale enclosed in an opaque black bag or of
the baggie of methamphetamine hidden in the passenger side door of the car she was driving.
In the alternative, relief should be granted because the failure to give a unanimity
instruction requiring the jury to agree as to which methamphetamine (the residue or the baggie)
was possessed was fundamental error which denied Ms. Southwick's unwaived constitutional
rights to a jury trial and due process and affected the verdict.
B.

Procedural History

Ms. Southwick was charged with a single count of possession of methamphetamine in
violation ofl.C. § 37-2732(c)(l). R 55-56. A jury found her guilty and she was subsequently
sentenced to a term of three years fixed followed by three indeterminate for a total of six years.
The court retained jurisdiction for 365 days. R 197-204. According to the district court register
of actions, on March 21, 2014, Ms. Southwick was placed upon three years of probation. ROA
3/21114. (Motion to Augment pending.)
This appeal timely follows. R 203-205.
C.

Statement of the Case

The state presented three witnesses to prove its case: Kevin Hanners and Russell Kerry,

who were involved in a traffic stop of Ms. Southwick, and Jay Wiggins, from the state lab. Tr. p.
2.
Buhl Patrol Sergeant Hanners testified that on August 18, 2012, about 4:00 p.m., he
stopped a car because of an expired registration sticker. Tr. p. 11, In. 11 - p. 12, In. 25. Ms.
Southwick was driving and Kevin Mingo was in the passenger seat. Ms. Southwick said that she
lived at Mr. Mingo's residence. Tr. p. 13, In. 5-25. Ms. Southwick told Sgt. Hanners that the
registered owner of the car had given the car to her on the condition that she get it properly
registered and insured. Tr. p. 15, In. 16-23.
Sgt. Hanners testified that he asks "pretty much everybody out there that I come in
contact with if they have anything illegal in their vehicles." Tr. p. 17, In. 21-25. He "further
defines" this by asking specifically and individually about methamphetamine, marijuana, and
paraphernalia. Tr. p. 18, In. 1-4. He testified that Ms. Southwick looked directly at him and
stated "affirmative, no" when asked about marijuana. Tr. p. 18, In. 9-10. However, on both
methamphetamine and paraphernalia, according to Sgt. Hanners, Ms. Southwick failed to make
eye contact and "kind of drew out a no." Tr. p. 18, ln. 5-14.
This made Sgt. Hanners suspicious, so he called for a canine officer. Tr. p. 18, In. 21-25.
In the meantime, Mr. Mingo got out of the car. Mr. Mingo and Ms. Southwick had two
dogs with them and Mr. Mingo was taking one of the dogs out to relieve itself. Tr. p. 19, In. 2025.
Sgt. Hanners went to see what was going on and then watched as Mr. Mingo put the dog
back in the car. Sgt. Hanners went back to his car and observed Mr. Mingo "moving around
quite a bit," "leaning from side to side" "which is not consistent with people on traffic stops."
2

Sgt. Hanners testified that he had been doing traffic work a long time and had never seen anyone
move around like that before. Tr. p. 20, In. 3-24.
Sgt. Hanners and Deputy Wiggins, who had arrived with his canine partner, had Ms.
Southwick, Mr. Mingo and their dogs get out of the car. Sgt. Hanners testified that Ms.
Southwick "asked me, 'Because this is not my car, I'm not responsible for anything in the
vehicle.'" Tr. p. 21, In. 15-18.
While they watched the canine search, Mr. Mingo asked whether it is illegal to possess
scales. Tr. p. 20, In. 25 - p. 21, In. 1.
Deputy Wiggins searched the car and found a scale stuffed down in between the driver
and passenger seats - it was not visible, but he found it when he reached in between the seats. Tr.
p. 47, In. 15 - p. 48, In. 2.
The scale was inside a black zippered case. To see the scale, the zipper had to be opened.
Tr. p. 60, In. 25 - p. 61, In. 13. Sgt. Hanners could not recall whether the case was zippered shut
or open when the officers found the scale. Tr. p. 64, ln. 23-25. Deputy Wiggins could not even
recall what the scale looked like. Tr. p. 48, In. 6-8. Sgt. Hanners testified that the item could not
be recognized as a digital scale before the case was opened, but once opened, it was possible to
see methamphetamine residue on the scale. Tr. p. 65, In. 17-25.
Sgt. Hanners testified that Ms. Southwick told him that she knew the scale was in the car,
that she had been asked to hold it for another person, that it had been on the dash board, but was
sliding around, and so she and Mr. Mingo put it between the seats to stop the sliding. Tr. p. 27,
In. 2-8.
In addition to the scale, the police found a baggie of methamphetamine inside the
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passenger door panel - down at the bottom of the door. Tr. p. 49, In. 1-5. Deputy Wiggins, who
discovered the baggie and gave it to Sgt. Hanners, could not remember whether the door panel
was already removed or he had to remove it to find the baggie. Tr. p. 49, In. 6-8; p. 50, In. 1-4.
He did remember that the baggie was not easily accessible and that he had to use his asp to get at
it. Tr. p. 50, In. 10-15.
The court instructed the jury:
A person has possession of something if the person knows of its presence and has
physical control of it or has the power and intention to control it. More than one
person can be in possession of something if each knows of its presence and has
the power and intention to control it.
Second Supp. Tr. p. 89, In. 1-7.
However, the jury was never instructed that it must unanimously agree as to which
methamphetamine was possessed by Ms. Southwick - be that on the scale or in the baggie.
Second Supp. Tr. p. 85, In. 1 - p 93, In. 8.
In closing the state relied upon both the methamphetamine residue on the scale and the
methamphetamine hidden inside the passenger door for a conviction. Second Supp. Tr. p. 98, In.
10 -p. 99, In. 24.

III. ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Did the state present constitutionally sufficient evidence to support the guilty verdict?
U.S. Const. Amends. 5 and 14; Idaho Const. Art. I,§ 13.
2. Did the district court commit fundamental error in failing to give a unanimity
instruction? U.S. Const. Amends. 5, 6 and 14; Idaho Const. Art. I,§ 7.

4

IV. ARGUMENT
A.

The Evidence was Insufficient

The conviction must be vacated and a judgment of acquittal entered because the evidence
was insufficient.
Due process requires that no person be convicted except upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every element of the offense. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,361 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1071
(1970); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.307,315-6, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2787 (1979).
In an appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, a guilty verdict will be
overturned when there is not substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could
have found that the prosecution sustained the burden of proving the essential elements beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Warburton, 145 Idaho 760, 761-2, 185 P.3d 272, 273-4 (Ct. App.
2008), citing State v. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho 383,385,957 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Ct. App. 1998);

State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104, 822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct. App. 1991). The appellate court
does not substitute its view for that of the trier of fact as to the credibility of the witnesses, the
weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.

Id., citing Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d at 1001; State v. Decker, 108 Idaho 683,684, 701
P.2d 303, 304 (Ct. App. 1985). And, the evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the
state. Id., citing Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho at 385, 957 P.2d at 1101; Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104,
822 P.2d at 1001. However, if the evidence is not sufficient to support the conviction, the
defendant is entitled to an acquittal. Herrera-Brito, supra. See also, State v. Curry, 153 Idaho
394, 396-97, 283 P.3d 141, 143-44 (Ct. App. 2012).
To establish possession, the state had to establish both that Ms. Southwick knew of the
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drugs and had the power and intention to control them. State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237,242, 985
P.2d 117, 122 (1999); State v. Seitter, 127 Idaho 356, 359, 900 P.2d 1367, 1370 (1995).
Constructive possession of a controlled substance exists where a nexus between the accused and
the substance is sufficiently proven so as to give rise to the reasonable inference that the accused
was not simply a bystander, but rather had the power and intent to exercise dominion and control
over the substance. State v. Rogerson, 132 Idaho 53, 58,966 P.2d 53, 58 (Ct. App. 1998); State
v. Rozajewski, 130 Idaho 644, 647, 945 P.2d 1390, 1393 (Ct. App. 1997). Knowledge of the

controlled substance and physical control of the controlled substance must be independently
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, by either circumstantial or direct evidence. Seitter, 127 Idaho
at 360,900 P.2d at 1371; Rogerson, 132 Idaho at 58, 966 P.2d at 58; Rozajewski, 130 Idaho at
647,945 P.2d at 1393.
In this case, the state did not provide sufficient evidence. With regard to the scale, the
state's evidence showed that the scale was contained in a zippered container. The residue could
not be seen from outside the container. While the state did offer proof that Ms. Southwick knew
that the container held a scale per her statement that she was holding the scale for someone else,
the state offered no proof whatsoever that Ms. Southwick had ever looked inside the container
and seen the residue. Therefore, as to the methamphetamine residue on the scale, there was no
proof of knowledge.
Moreover, even if the lack of proof of knowledge of the residue is overlooked, the state
also failed to present evidence that Ms. Southwick had the power and the intent to control the
residue. Compare, State v. Burnside, 115 Idaho 882, 885, 771 P.2d 546, 549 (Ct. App. 1989),
holding that evidence was insufficient to prove control over illegal mushrooms contained in a
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black vinyl bag found in Burnside's car while Burnside was driving when the state failed to rebut
another's testimony of sole ownership.
With regard to the baggie, the state proved neither knowledge nor the power and intent to
exercise dominion and control. The state proved that the baggie was down inside the passenger
door and not accessible except through the use of tools. The state offered no proof that Ms.
Southwick knew of the baggie nor that, if she knew of it, she had the power or the intent to
control it.
Sgt. Hanner's testimony about how he extends every traffic stop beyond its initial purpose
to include questioning about whether the vehicle contains any contraband and Ms. Southwick's
answers to his inquiries does not alter the lack of proof. Sgt. Hanner testified that Ms. Southwick
was quick to answer that the car did not contain marijuana but was more hesitant when
questioned about metharnphetamine and paraphernalia. However, her knowledge of
paraphernalia in the car is not probative of her knowledge of residue on the paraphernalia as there
was no evidence that she had ever looked inside the zippered case or been told by the owner of
the scale that there was residue on the scale or that she had any power or intent to control that
residue. And, her hesitation over the question about methamphetarnine was consistent with
knowledge that Mr. Mingo was in the car and that, based upon her knowledge of him, he may
have been carrying methamphetamine, but was not probative that she had the power or the intent
to control any metharnphetamine he may have secreted into the car.
The evidence presented by the state was not substantial evidence upon which a reasonable
trier of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained the burden of proving the essential
elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Warburton, supra; State v. Knutson, supra; Curry, supra.
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The evidence was insufficient to prove knowledge and power and intention to control.
Therefore, the conviction must be reversed and a judgment of acquittal entered.

B.

Failure to Give a Unanimity Instruction was Fundamental Error

As set out above, Ms. Southwick's conviction must be reversed and an acquittal entered
because the evidence was constitutionally insufficient. But, even if the evidence had been
sufficient, reversal would be required because the court failed to give a unanimity instruction.
"In all felony cases, the jury's verdict must be a unanimous verdict." Idaho Const. Art. I,
§ 7; State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 977-78, 188 P.3d 912, 919-920 (2008). In this case, the
state presented evidence going to two discrete acts - possession of the residue on the scale and
possession of the baggie - each of which, had they been proved, would independently support a
conviction for possession. Therefore, the jury should have been instructed that it must
unanimously agree on the specific occurrence constituting the offense. State v. Molen, 148 Idaho
950, 957-58, 231 P.3d 1047, 2054-55 (Ct. App. 2010), citing Idaho Const. Art. I,§ 7; LC.§§ 192316 and 2317; ICR 31; State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694,701,215 P.3d 414,431 (2009); State
v. Montoya, 140 Idaho 160, 167-68, 90 P.3d 910, 917-18 (Ct. App. 2004); Miller v. State, 135
Idaho 261, 266-68, 16 P.3d 937, 942-44 (Ct. App. 2000).
While no objection was raised below, the error may be addressed under the fundamental
error doctrine. "Though ICR 30(b) requires objections to jury instructions be made below, this
Court reviews fundamental errors in jury instructions even in the absence of an objection below."
State v. Johnson, supra, citing State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 749, 170 P.3d 886, 892 (2007).
See also, State v. Gerado, 147 Idaho 22, 29,205 P.3d 671,678 (Ct. App. 2009). See also, State
v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345,364,313 P.3d 1, 20 (2012), applying a fundamental error analysis per
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State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,245 P.3d 961 (2010), to jury instruction issues raised for the first
time on appeal.
As held in Perry, the fundamental error doctrine requires a three prong inquiry wherein
the appellant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the error ( 1) violated one or
more of the appellant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists, without the need for
any additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision, and (3) was not harmless. 150 Idaho at 22728, 245 P.3d at 979-80, as quoted in State v. Dunlap, supra.
In this case, the failure to give a unanimity instruction violated Ms. Southwick's state and
federal constitutional rights to a unanimous jury verdict, rights the record shows that she did not
waive. Idaho Const. Art. I,§ 7; United States Const. Amends. 6 and 14. Smith v. State, 146
Idaho 822,835,203 P.3d 1221, 1234, ftnt. 11 (2008), noting that there is a presumption against
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and waiver will not be presumed based upon a silent
record. Thus, the first prong of Perry's fundamental error test is met.
Moreover, the error was plain. Idaho case law holds that "[a] specific unanimity
instruction is required ... when it appears ... that a conviction may occur as the result of
different jurors concluding that the defendant committed different acts." State v. Gain, 140 Idaho
170, 172, 90 P.3d 920, 922 (Ct. App. 2004).
Where the evidence indicates that separate and distinct incidents of criminal
conduct could provide a basis for a juror's finding of guilt on the criminal charge
in any count, the trial court must instruct the jury that it must unanimously agree
on the specific incident constituting the offense in each count, regardless of
whether the defendant requests such an instruction.
Id., citing Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261, 266-68, 16 P.3d 937, 242-44 (Ct. App. 2000).
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[Where] several distinct criminal acts support one count, jury unanimity must be
protected by the state's election of the act upon which it will rely for conviction or
by a clarifying instruction requiring the jurors to unanimously agree that the same
underlying criminal act has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Gain, 140 Idaho at 173, 90 P .3d at 923 (emphasis original).

In this case, evidence of two distinct acts was presented regarding the single count of
possession - the alleged possession of the residue on the scale and the alleged possession of the
baggie found inside the passenger door. Yet, the state did not elect a single one of these acts to
support the charges. Rather, it expressly relied on both. Given these circumstances, failure to
give a unanimity instruction was plain error. Id. Thus, the second prong of Perry's :fundamental
error analysis is met.
Lastly, the error was not harmless. An error is not harmless if there is a reasonable
possibility that it affected the outcome of the trial. Perry, 150 Idaho at 228,245 P.3d at 980. As
discussed above, the evidence was insufficient to prove possession of either the residue on the
scale or the baggie inside the passenger door panel. Given the insufficiency of the evidence,
there is a reasonable possibility that the error in not giving a unanimity instruction affected the
outcome of the case. It is reasonably possible that the state did not convince all twelve jurors of
possession of both the residue and the baggie. And, if not all twelve were convinced of both, it is
reasonably possible that had a unanimity instruction been given, a guilty verdict would not have
been returned. Thus, the third prong of Perry is satisfied.
The failure to give the unanimity instruction was fundamental error which requires
reversal.
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V. CONCLUSION
Ms. Southwick asks this Court to vacate the conviction and enter a judgment of acquittal
because the evidence was constitutionally insufficient. In the alternative, she asks that this Court
reverse her conviction because the district court committed fundamental error in not giving a
unanimity instruction.
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Respectfully submitted this

15- day of April, 2014.

Deborah Whipp!~
Attorney for Tami Southwick
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